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ABSTRACT 
 
In this article, Professor Daniel Solove deconstructs and critiques the 
privacy paradox and the arguments made about it. The “privacy 
paradox” is the phenomenon where people say that they value privacy 
highly, yet in their behavior relinquish their personal data for very little 
in exchange or fail to use measures to protect their privacy.  
 
Commentators typically make one of two types of arguments about the 
privacy paradox. On one side, the “behavior valuation argument” 
contends behavior is the best metric to evaluate how people actually 
value privacy. Behavior reveals that people ascribe a low value to 
privacy or readily trade it away for goods or services. The argument 
often goes on to contend that privacy regulation should be reduced.  
 
On the other side, the “behavior distortion argument” argues that 
people’s behavior isn’t an accurate metric of preferences because 
behavior is distorted by biases and heuristics, manipulation and 
skewing, and other factors.   
 
In contrast to both of these camps, Professor Solove argues that the 
privacy paradox is a myth created by faulty logic. The behavior 
involved in privacy paradox studies involves people making decisions 
about risk in very specific contexts. In contrast, people’s attitudes about 
their privacy concerns or how much they value privacy are much more 
general in nature. It is a leap in logic to generalize from people’s risk 
decisions involving specific personal data in specific contexts to reach 
broader conclusions about how people value their own privacy.  
 
The behavior in the privacy paradox studies doesn’t lead to a conclusion 
for less regulation. On the other hand, minimizing behavioral distortion 
will not cure people’s failure to protect their own privacy.  It is perfectly 
rational for people—even without any undue influences on behavior—
to fail to make good assessments of privacy risks and to fail to manage 
their privacy effectively. Managing one’s privacy is a vast, complex, and 
never-ending project that does not scale; it becomes virtually 
impossible to do comprehensively. Privacy regulation often seeks to 
give people more privacy self-management, such as the recent 
California Consumer Privacy Act. Professor Solove argues that giving 
individuals more tasks for managing their privacy will not provide 
effective privacy protection. Instead, regulation should employ a 
different strategy – focus on regulating the architecture that structures 
the way information is used, maintained, and transferred.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Many studies have shown that people’s attitudes about privacy differ a lot 
from their behavior. In surveys, people say that they value privacy highly, 
yet they readily give away sensitive personal information for small discounts 
or tiny benefits – or sometimes for nothing at all. People express strong 
concern about privacy yet fail to take easy and inexpensive steps to protect 
their privacy. This phenomenon is known as the “privacy paradox.”2  
 
Why is the privacy paradox occurring? What should be done about it? What 
direction should privacy regulation take in light of the privacy paradox? 
Countless attempts have been made to examine and understand the 
paradox as well as propose recommendations for law and policy.  A search 
of “privacy paradox” in Google Scholar produces more than 7,000 results.3 
The privacy paradox plays a significant role in debates about privacy and 
how it should be regulated.   
 
Responses to the privacy paradox typically take one of two opposing sides.  
One side advances what I call the “behavior valuation argument.” 
Commentators in this camp embrace the privacy paradox and argue that 
behavior more reliably indicates how much people value their privacy than 
their stated attitudes.4 Because people trade their privacy for small rewards, 
their behavior reveals that they ascribe a low value to their privacy. 
Proponents of the behavior valuation argument often take a step further; 
they contend that the privacy paradox suggests that privacy regulation 
should be weakened, curtailed, or not enacted.  The argument notes that 
privacy regulation is often sparked by people’s stated concerns about 
privacy; but people’s behavior indicates that these concerns are inflated and 
that people are readily trading off their privacy for the benefits of new 
technologies or for free or discounted goods and services. Accordingly, 
regulators should be reluctant to interfere.  
 
On the opposite side, other commentators respond to the privacy paradox 
by trying to explain away the variance between attitudes and behavior. In 
what I call the “behavior distortion argument,” commentators argue that 
the people’s behavior is irrational or inconsistent with their actual 
preferences.5 Commentators point to influences which distort people’s 
behavior, such as biases and heuristics or manipulation and skewing.  
Behavior is thus not a reliable metric for how much people value their 
privacy.  The implication for policy is that privacy regulation should attempt 
to reduce the distorting influences on behavior so that people make choices 
 
2 See infra Part I.  
3 Search Results from Google on January 12, 2020, 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C9&q=%22privacy+paradox%22
&btnG=. 
4 See infra Part II.  
5 See infra Part III.  
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more in line with their actual preferences.   
 
In this Article, I take a different path. I argue that the privacy paradox isn’t 
a paradox.  The privacy paradox doesn’t need to be explained because it 
doesn’t exist. When properly understood, behavior and attitudes about 
privacy are not out of alignment. The privacy paradox is essentially an 
illusion created by faulty logic, unwarranted generalizations, and conflated 
issues.   
 
The Article begins with background about the privacy paradox and the 
opposing arguments in response to it.  In Part I, I discuss the privacy 
paradox.  In Part II, I examine the behavior valuation argument and in Part 
III, I explore the behavior distortion argument.   
 
In Part IV, I advance my primary contention: The privacy paradox is a myth. 
Attitudes and behavior only appear to be in conflict; they actually involve 
different things. The behavior in the privacy paradox involves people 
making decisions about risk in very specific contexts. In contrast, people’s 
attitudes about their privacy concerns or how much they value privacy are 
much more general in nature. The behavior valuation argument generalizes 
from people’s risk decisions involving specific personal data in specific 
contexts to reach broader conclusions about how people value their own 
privacy. This generalization is a leap in logic; it does not follow from the 
behavior in the studies. Moreover, the behavior valuation argument often 
views people’s sharing data with organizations as conflicting with their 
concerns about privacy. But as I have argued in previous works, “privacy” 
involves a plurality of different things that extend far beyond just keeping 
data secret.6 A person does not surrender all privacy when sharing data with 
others. Many privacy protections remain in place. The inconsistency in 
attitudes and behavior turns out to be just a myopic misunderstanding of 
privacy. 
 
In Part V, I examine the policy and regulatory implications of the behavior 
exhibited in the privacy paradox. Although I aim to debunk the privacy 
paradox, the exhibited behavior is still quite real. People are not taking 
measures to protect their own privacy and are readily sharing their personal 
data.  What is the import of this behavior on policy and regulation?  
 
I contend that the conclusion of the behavior valuation argument – that 
privacy regulation overvalues privacy and ought to be curtailed – is based 
on a series of conflated issues and faulty logic. Individual risk decisions in 
particular contexts indicate little about how people value their own privacy, 
which is distinct from how people value privacy in general.  Further, I argue 
that the value of privacy cannot be determined empirically by examining 
individual valuations of privacy and cannot be reduced to a monetary figure 
 
6 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008).  
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based on specific transactions. Privacy’s value is as a constitutive element 
in society, not a bartered good in the marketplace.  
 
Further, I examine whether privacy regulation should try to counter the 
distorting influences on behavior to make people behave more rationally to 
align their actions with their stated preferences.  Although minimizing these 
distorting influences could be helpful to a limited degree, I contend that 
even greatly reducing the distortion would not lead to significant 
improvement in privacy protection.  Even a rational decisionmaker without 
any undue influences on behavior will fail to make good assessments of 
privacy risks and fail to manage her privacy effectively.   
 
The reason for people’s failure to manage privacy effectively, I argue, is 
based on the futility of what I call “privacy self-management.”7  Privacy self-
management involves the various decisions people must make about their 
privacy and the tasks people are given the choice to do regarding their 
privacy, such as reading privacy policies, opting out, changing privacy 
settings, and so on. Managing one’s privacy is a vast, complex, and never-
ending project that does not scale; it becomes virtually impossible to do 
comprehensively. The best people can do is manage their privacy 
haphazardly. People can’t learn enough about privacy risks to make 
informed decisions about their privacy. People will never gain sufficient 
knowledge of the ways in which personal data will be combined, aggregated, 
and analyzed over the years by thousands of organizations. Resignation is a 
rational response to the impossibility of privacy self-management.  
 
Unfortunately, existing privacy regulation relies too heavily on privacy self-
management as a means of privacy protection. For example, the recent 
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) provides individuals with a series 
of rights to manage their privacy such as a right to find out about data 
collected about them and a right to opt out of the sale of their data.8 When 
privacy regulation gives people more control over their personal data, and 
people fail to complete the tasks to exercise greater control, the behavior 
valuation argument cites this behavior as evidence that people don’t really 
care about their privacy. However, as I contend, doing countless tasks to 
exercise more control is an endless and impractical task – and the control 
is often illusory.  
 
Therefore, I recommend taking privacy regulation in different direction. 
Privacy regulation can be best strengthened by regulating in ways that don’t 
rely on individuals managing their own privacy. Instead, privacy regulation 
should focus on regulating the architecture that structures the way 
information is used, maintained, and transferred.   
 
7 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV 
1879 (2013). 
8 California Consumer Privacy Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100-1798.199 (2018). 
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I. THE PRIVACY PARADOX AND ITS IMPACT 
 
The privacy paradox has been documented by countless scholars and 
commentators. The phenomenon is based on experiments, surveys, or 
general observations about behavior. 
 
Before the privacy paradox received its moniker, early studies revealed an 
inconsistency between stated privacy attitudes and people’s behavior. A  
study in 2002 led by Sarah Spiekermann compared participants’ privacy 
preferences to the personal data they disclosed to an anthropomorphic chat 
bot while shopping online.9  The researchers originally hypothesized that 
people who are more concerned about their privacy would be less detailed, 
forthcoming, and truthful when answering questions. Instead, to the 
surprise of the researchers, “participants displayed a surprising readiness 
to reveal private and even highly personal information and to let themselves 
be ‘drawn into’ communication with the anthropomorphic 3-D bot.”10 The 
findings were particularly eye-opening because the “bot questions were 
designed to include many non-legitimate and unimportant personal 
questions.”11  Participants also “had to sign that they agreed to the selling of 
their data to an anonymous entity.” The researchers noted: 
 
A majority of persons who participated in the shopping 
experiment disclosed so much information about themselves that 
a relatively revealing profile could be constructed on the basis of 
only one shopping session. This result is not only alarming in itself, 
but even more so given that, for many participants, this behavior 
stands in sharp contrast to their self-reported privacy attitude.12  
 
Subsequent studies revealed a similar inconsistency between people’s 
privacy attitudes and behavior.  A 2005 study led by Bettina Berent found 
that people “do not always act in line with their stated privacy preferences, 
giving away information about themselves without any compelling reason 
to do so.”13  In 2006, a  study by economics professor Alessandro Acquisti 
and computer scientist Ralph Gross found a dichotomy between people’s 
privacy concerns and Facebook use practices: “We detected little or no 
 
9 Sarah Spiekermann, Jens Grossklags, Jens, Bettina Berendt. E-Privacy in 2nd 
Generation E-Commerce: Privacy Preferences Versus Actual Behavior, EC '01: 
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce 38 (2002), 
available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2480871_E-
privacy_in_2nd_Generation_E-
Commerce_Privacy_Preferences_Versus_actual_Behavior. 
10 Id. at 8.  
11 Id. at 8.  
12 Id. at 8.  
13 Bettina Berendt et al., Privacy in E-Commerce: Stated Preferences vs. Actual Behavior, 
48 Communications of the ACM at 104 (2005).  
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relation between participants’ reported privacy attitudes and their 
likelihood of providing certain information, even when controlling, 
separately, for male and female members.”14  
 
In 2007, the disconnect between attitudes and behavior was given a name 
– the “privacy paradox” – from an article called The Privacy Paradox: 
Personal Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors.15  The name 
stuck, and has become the common way of referring to the phenomenon.   
 
Privacy paradox studies are now legion.  Broadly, the studies reach a few 
different findings. Some studies demonstrate that despite people expressing 
concern about privacy, they fail to take easy and inexpensive privacy-
protective measures.  For example, a study by Alessandro Acquisti and Jens 
Grossklags revealed that nearly 90% of participants said they were 
“moderately or very concerned about privacy.”16  When behavior was 
examined, many people admitted to not engaging in certain privacy-
protective measures: “87.5 percent of individuals with high concerns toward 
the collection of offline identifying information (such as name and address) 
signed up for a loyalty card using their real identifying information.”17 Of 
people “who were particularly concerned about credit card fraud and 
identity theft only 25.9 percent used credit alert features.” 18 Of the people 
who agreed that “privacy should be protected by each individual with the 
help of technology,” a large number didn’t take certain privacy-protective 
technological measures: “62.5 percent never used encryption, 43.7 percent 
do not use email filtering technologies, and 50.0 percent do not use 
shredders for documents to avoid leaking sensitive information.”19 
 
Other studies show that despite people saying that they value privacy highly, 
they will nevertheless share their personal data with third parties for small 
amounts of money. For example, in a study conducted in Europe by Alastair 
Beresford, subjects were asked to purchase a DVD from one of two identical 
stores.20  One store sold the DVDs for 1 Euro less than the other, but the 
cheaper store requested more sensitive data.  Both stores requested the 
subject’s name, postal address, and email address. However, the cheaper 
 
14 Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph Gross. Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information 
Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook, PET 2006, 
https://dataprivacylab.org/dataprivacy/projects/facebook/facebook2.pdf. 
15 Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R. Horne, and David A. Horne, The Privacy Paradox: 
Personal Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. Consumer Affairs 100 
(2007).  
16 Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual 
Decision Making, IEEE Security & Privacy 24 (Jan/Feb 2005)., 
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti.pdf. 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Alastair R. Beresford, Dorothea Kübler, and Sören Preibusch, Unwillingness to Pay for 
Privacy: A Field Experiment 117 Economics Letters 25 (2012).  
http://ftp.iza.org/dp5017.pdf.  
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store required date of birth and monthly income whereas the more 
expensive store required year of birth and favorite color.  Despite 95% of 
subjects saying that they were “interested in the protection of their personal 
information” and 75% saying that they “have a very strong interest in data 
protection,” nearly all subjects chose the store with the cheaper price but 
requiring more personal data.21 
 
A study by Bernardo Reynolds compared people’s stated privacy attitudes 
to their social media activity on Facebook and found “little correlation 
between participants’ broader concern about privacy on Facebook and their 
actual posting practices: both the number of postings and the portion of 
those posts visible to a large audience appear to be independent of general 
privacy attitudes.”22 
 
A study lead by Susanne Barth involving smartphones and the downloading 
of mobile apps concluded that “despite the fact users still claim to be 
concerned about the potential misuse of their personal data, they remain 
unwilling to invest either the time and effort or the money necessary to 
protect their privacy.”23  The researchers examined participants’ knowledge 
about privacy risks and found that increased knowledge did not correlate to 
increased privacy-protective behavior: “Despite their technical 
backgrounds and a higher than average understanding of privacy intrusion 
possibilities, participants were not willing to pay for their privacy.”24   
 
In their study of people’s use of Gmail and Facebook, Lior Strahilevitz and 
Matthew Kugler found results “consistent with the privacy paradox.”25 With 
the use of Gmail, a free email service which scans and analyzes the content 
of people’s email, “the mean respondent rated automated content analysis 
of e-mails as 7.63 out of 10 on an intrusiveness scale.”26  However, only 
about 35% of respondents were willing to pay money for an email service 
that didn’t scan and analyze content.  Of those willing to pay, the median 
amount was just $15 per year. Only 3% of respondents would pay more than 
 
21 Id.  
22 Bernardo Reynolds, Jayant Venkatanathan, Jorge Gonçalves, and Vassilis Kostakos, 
Sharing Ephemeral Information in Online Social Networks: Privacy Perceptions and 
Behaviours, Conference Paper, 2011, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 
221054832.  
23 Susanne Barth et al, Putting the Privacy Paradox to the Test: Online Privacy and 
Security Behaviors Among Users with Technical Knowledge, Privacy Awareness, and 
Financial Resources, 41 Telematics and Informatics 55 (2019).  
24 Id.   
25 Lior Strahilevitz & Matthew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to 
Consumers? 45 Journal of Legal Studies 569, 578 (2016). “[C]onsumers seem to regard 
themselves as having authorized several controversial privacy-related practices by Google, 
Yahoo, and Facebook regardless of whether they were randomly assigned to read vague 
language that does not seem to explain the corporate practices in any meaningful detail or 
precise language that describes the corporate practices at issue with admirable clarity and 
specificity.”  Id. at 592.  
26 Id. at 578.  
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$120 per year.27 Strahilevitz and Kugler concluded: “Although consumers 
dislike automated content analysis, their willingness to pay for a version of 
Gmail that does not perform content analysis is quite limited, and there is 
no evidence to indicate that concerns about e-mail content analysis are 
presently driving consumers to choose substitute e-mail services that 
eschew e-mail content analysis.”28   
 
A number of studies demonstrate that people share personal data for low 
amounts of money.  One study found that people provided their online 
browsing history for 7 Euros ($10).29  Another study found that people 
downloading smartphone apps were willing to pay only in the range of about 
$1 to $4 to avoid revealing to the app developer various types of personal 
data such as browsing histories, text messages, locations, and contact lists.30 
Grossklags and Acqusiti found that “individuals almost always chose to sell 
their information and almost never elect[ed] to protect their information 
even for values as little as $0.25.”31  
 
Some studies have produced findings that cut against the privacy paradox 
to at least some degree. 32  For example, a study by Eszter Hargittai and Eden 
Litt demonstrated that people with “higher Internet privacy skills are more 
likely to manage self-presentation online actively.”33 A study by danah boyd 
and Eszter Hargittai revealed that contrary to the privacy paradox, the 
teenagers they studied behaved in ways that indicated that they were not 
cavalier about their privacy: “Overall, our data show that far from being 
nonchalant and unconcerned about privacy matters, the majority of young 
adult users of Facebook are engaged with managing their privacy settings 
on the site at least to some extent.”34 In a study by Kirsten Martin, a “trust 
game experiment shows respondents are less willing to engage with a 
 
27 Id. at 578. 
28 Id. at 593.  
29 Juan Pablo Carrascal et al., Your browsing behavior for a big mac, Proceedings of the 
22nd international conference on World Wide Web - WWW 13 (2013). 
30 Scott Savage & Donald M. Waldman, The Value of Online Privacy  (2013), at  
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2341311. 
31 Jens Grossklags & Alessandro Acquisti, When 25 Cents is Too Much: An Experiment on 
Willingness-To-Sell and Willingness-To-Protect Personal Information (June 7, 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~jensg/research/paper/Grossklags_Acquisti-
WEIS07.pdf.  
32 Spyros Kokolakis cites to more than 10 studies between 2010 and 2019 that “provide 
evidence that challenge the privacy paradox hypothesis.”  Spyros Kokolakis, Privacy 
Attitudes and Privacy Behaviour: A Review of Current Research on 
the Privacy  Paradox Phenomenon, 64 Computers & Society 1, 10-11 (2015).  
33 Eszter Hargittai and Eden Litt, New Strategies For Employment? Internet Skills and 
Online Privacy Practices During People's Job Search. 11 IEEE Security and Privacy 38 
(2013), https://doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2013.64. 
34 danah boyd and Eszter Hargittai, Facebook Privacy Settings: Who Cares? 15 First 
Monday (Aug. 2010), 
https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3086/2589.  
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partner who violated privacy by utilizing an ad network as compared to one 
who used privacy preserving advertising – even when financially 
advantageous to the individual.”35 These studies, however, have not done 
much to change the prevailing view about the existence of the privacy 
paradox.   
 
III. PARADOX EMBRACED: 
THE BEHAVIOR VALUATION ARGUMENT 
 
Many commentators embrace the privacy paradox, drawing policy 
conclusions that privacy regulation should be lessened because people’s 
behavior indicates that they don’t value privacy very highly.36  
 
The behavior valuation argument begins by contending that behavior is a 
more accurate measure of how people value privacy than their expressed 
attitudes. In economic literature, attitudes are referred to as “stated 
preferences” and behavior is referred to as “revealed preferences.”37 The 
behavior valuation argument posits that people’s revealed preferences are a 
better indication of their actual preferences than their stated preferences.38 
The argument then contends that the privacy paradox demonstrates that 
people ascribe a fairly low value to their privacy or that they readily trade 
away their privacy for goods and services.  Often, the argument advances a 
policy conclusion: Privacy regulation is too often influenced by what people 
say about how much they value privacy or how concerned they are about 
privacy. Instead, regulation should focus on behavior. People’s revealed 
preferences indicates that they don’t value their privacy very much, that 
they are not as concerned about privacy as they say they are, and that they 
are fine with trading their personal data for the rewards that companies are 
 
35 Kirsten Martin, Breaking the Privacy Paradox: The Value of Privacy and Associated 
Duty of Firms (working draft), https://ssrn.com//abstract=3349448.  
36 See .e.g. L. Gordon Crovitz, Privacy? We Got Over It., Wall St. J., Aug. 25, 2008,  
 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121962391804567765.html (“[W]hatever we say about 
how much we value privacy, a close look at our actual behavior suggests we have gotten 
over it.”). 
37 WOLFRAM ELSNER, TORSTEN HEINRICH AND HENNING SCHWARDT, THE MICROECONOMICS 
OF COMPLEX ECONOMIES: EVOLUTIONARY, INSTITUTIONAL, AND COMPLEXITY PERSPECTIVES  
§6.4.1 (2015) (“The objective of the ‘revealed preferences’ approach was to remove all traces 
of utility and subjective (unobservable) states, or, unobservable preferences from 
explanations of consumer behavior. . . .”); Sabah Abdullah, Anil Markanda, and Paulo 
A.L.D. Nunes, Introduction To Economic Valuation  Methods  in  RESEARCH  TOOLS  IN  
NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 143 (Amit  Batabyal  &  Peter  
Nijkamp eds. 2011), available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300134725_Introduction_to_Economic_Val
uation_Methods. 
38 The notion that revealed preferences are a better reflection of people’s actual preferences 
originates in revealed preference theory, which was developed by economist Paul 
Samuelson. See Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumers' Behaviour, 
17 ECONOMICA NEW SERIES 61 (1938). 
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offering, such as free or discounted goods or services.  
 
For example, law professor James Cooper argues: “[S]urveys, or what 
economists call ‘stated preference,’ tell us only that privacy, like most other 
things, has value. It cannot answer the real question for policymakers: How 
willing are consumers to swap personal data for other things they value? 
These tradeoffs are what matter.”39  Cooper then contends:  
 
Once the focus shifts to what economists call “revealed preference,” 
or how consumers actually make tradeoffs, the story becomes quite 
different. Far from suggesting that consumers are reticent to 
engage the online ecosystem, the real world behavior illustrates 
consumers who are largely comfortable with the tradeoffs they 
make in their digital lives.40  
 
Cooper notes that “economic studies that have attempted to measure the 
value of personal data nearly universally find that even when consumers are 
fully aware of the trades they are making, they are willing to provide 
personal information for small amounts of compensation, or alternatively 
are only willing to pay very little to avoid personal data collection.”41 Cooper 
concludes that “most consumers are comfortable with the typical bargain of 
sharing information with faceless servers in return for free content and 
services, such as email and social networking platforms.”42 Thus, Cooper 
urges the FTC to curtail its enforcement actions against companies for 
privacy violations:  “Until it confronts the empirical evidence, the FTC has 
not made the case that it, rather than the market, is better at mediating how 
consumers trade among competing values. Indeed, the FTC’s posture 
appears to be based on the preferred mix of privacy and functionality for the 
most privacy sensitive consumers.”43 
 
In another article, Cooper, writing alongside former FTC Commissioner 
Joshua Wright, argues that “research finds that consumers are willing to 
accept small discounts and purchase recommendations in exchange for 
personal data.”44 The authors note that the results of the studies “are 
consistent with real world behavior in which consumers increasingly 
participate in online activities that reveal personal data to both known and 
 
39 James C. Cooper, Lessons from Antitrust: The Path to a More Coherent Privacy Policy, 
U.S. Chamber Foundation Report, Feb. 26. 2017, 
https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/reports/lessons-antitrust-path-more-coherent-
privacy-policy. 
40 Id.  
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 James C. Cooper and Joshua D. Wright, The Missing Role of Economics in FTC Privacy 
Policy, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY (Jules Polonetsky, Evan Selinger & 
Omer Tene, eds., 2017). 
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unknown parties.”45 Based on the privacy paradox, Cooper and Wright 
conclude that “most consumers are comfortable with the typical bargain of 
sharing information  with faceless servers in return for free content and 
services, such as email and social networking platforms.”46 As a 
consequence, “the FTC’s enforcement posture is likely to be too aggressive 
by failing to consider this empirical evidence and by placing too much 
weight on opinions from the most privacy-sensitive constituents.”  They 
argue that the “FTC is using its bully pulpit to cajole companies into 
supplying too much privacy.”47 
 
Professor Omri Ben-Shahar writes that “people seem indifferent to Big Data 
collection. They share personal information on web platforms, knowing full 
well that it is collected by websites.”48 He goes on to note: “Even more 
striking is how little people value potential protections. Economists have 
found that people are willing to pay at most a few dollars to prevent their 
apps from harvesting data, such as the content of their text messages, stored 
on their smartphones.”49 Ben-Shahar reaches the conclusion that 
“Americans are nonchalant with respect to aggressive collection of their 
personal information.”50 In what he calls the “Grand Bargain in digital 
marketplace,” free services are offered in exchange for personal data, and 
this bargain is “largely good news for consumers” because most people 
“don’t mind paying with their data.”51 Only the “ticklish few—those who are 
more fussy about their privacy or have things to hide—can change the 
settings to turn off ‘dataveillance’ or buy anonymizing services for less than 
$100 per year.”52 Thus, he concludes, “There is no market failure in the Big 
Data sector and no proven need for protective regulation.”53 
 
Professor Eric Goldman points out that “consumers’ stated privacy 
concerns diverge from what consumers do.”54 What matters more than what 
consumers say is “how much consumers will pay – in time or money – for 
the corresponding benefits. For now, the cost-benefit ratio is tilted too high 
for consumers to spend much time or money on privacy.”55  He concludes: 
“Consumer behavior will tell companies what level of privacy to provide. Let 
the market continue unimpeded rather than chase phantom consumer fears 
through unnecessary regulation.”56   
 
 
45 Id.  
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Omri Ben-Shahar, Privacy Is the New Money, Thanks To Big Data, Forbes, Apr. 1, 2016. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Eric Goldman, The Privacy Hoax, Forbes (Oct. 14, 2002).  
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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Economics professor Caleb Fuller contends that the privacy paradox is due 
to the fact that “individuals express greater demands for digital privacy 
when they are not forced to consider the opportunity cost of that choice.”57 
Based on his study, Fuller argues that “[a]t least in the context of interacting 
with Google, the findings suggest that most individuals place relatively low 
values on privacy. A small expressed willingness to pay for privacy is 
consistent with behavior that seemingly disregards privacy threats.”58 He 
goes on note that the reason “why so many digital firms engage in 
information collection rather than adopting alternative methods of earning 
revenue” is because “consumers prefer exchanging information to 
exchanging money.”59 Fuller concludes that his study’s “results should add 
a dose of humility to the impulse to regulate digital privacy.”60 
 
III. PARADOX EXPLAINED:  
THE BEHAVIOR DISTORTION ARGUMENT 
 
There is another set of responses to the privacy paradox argument that takes 
an opposing path to the behavior valuation argument.  In what I call the 
“behavior distortion argument,” a group of commentators contend that 
behavior does not reliably reflect people’s actual privacy preferences. These 
commentators seek to explain why people’s behavior is not a reliable 
reflection of their true preferences. The behavior distortion argument 
points to a number of distorting influences on people’s behavior, such as 
biases and heuristics, framing effects, and behavioral manipulation and 
skewing.   
 
Interestingly, many of the commentators advancing the behavior distortion 
argument are the researchers whose studies are revealing the privacy 
paradox. Some study authors appear rather alarmed and troubled by their 
findings, and they proffer explanations that try to make sense of the 
problematic behavior.  For example, the Spiekermann study describes the 
results as “problematic” and “alarming.”61  The authors conclude: “This 
result suggests that the development of privacy technologies needs to take 
a twist into a new direction: they need to be designed in such a way that they 
allow even moderately computer-literate online users to protect themselves 
from the degree of self-disclosure they are afraid of. “62 
 
In this Part, I will explore various explanations for the privacy paradox 
based on distorting influences on behavior.   
 
57 Caleb S. Fuller, Is the Market for Digital Privacy a Failure?, 180 PUBLIC CHOICE 353–
353, 371 (2019). 
58 Id. at 371.  
59 Id. at 371.  
60 Id. at 371.  
61 Spiekermann, E-Privacy in 2nd Generation E-Commerce, supra note X at 8.    
62 Id. at 9.  
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A. BIASES AND HEURISTICS 
 
Many scholars have attempted to explain the privacy paradox by pointing 
to number of cognitive problems that provide an alternative rationale for 
people’s cavalier behavior toward privacy. These cognitive problems were 
originally explored by pioneering scholars Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman, who termed them “heuristics and biases.”63 Tversky and 
Kahneman began their careers at Hebrew University of Jerusalem in the 
psychology department.64 Starting in the 1970s, their studies demonstrated 
that people make decisions in irrationally – but in consistent ways. These 
decision-making problems were due to certain heuristics and biases that 
distorted people’s ability to assess their options in a rational manner.   Their 
work debunked the concept of the rational person in economics; they 
showed that people made decisions in irrational ways that did not maximize 
their self-interest. Economics has since embraced Tversky and Kahneman’s 
work, which forms the bedrock of behavioral economics. Kahneman went 
on to win the Nobel Prize in Economics.65  
 
Drawing from the work of Tversky and Kahneman, various scholars 
focusing on the privacy paradox have pointed to a number of biases and 
heuristics to explain people’s behavior.66 For example, Alessandro Acquisti 
and Jens Grossklags contend that people are limited by “bounded 
rationality,” which involves the difficulty figuring out what to do in complex 
situations involving costs, benefits, and risks.67  They also note that people 
tend to favor immediate gratification; people give up their data and don’t 
consider the long term costs and consequences.  This cognitive tendency is 
often referred to as “hyperbolic discounting.”68  
 
Another cognitive explanation for why people readily share personal data is 
that they have an illusory feeling of control. An article by Laura 
 
63 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases,  185 Science 1124 (1974); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011).  
64 Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Thaler, The Two Friends Who Changed How We Think 
About How We Think, The New Yorker (Dec. 7, 2016), at 
https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/the-two-friends-who-changed-how-we-
think-about-how-we-think.  For more information about the friendship and work of 
Tversky and Kahneman, see MICHAEL LEWIS, THE UNDOING PROJECT: A FRIENDSHIP THAT 
CHANGED OUR MINDS (2017).  
65 See Sunstein and Thaler, The Two Friends.  Tversky didn’t win because he had died, and 
the prize is not awarded posthumously. See id. 
66 In a survey of the privacy paradox literature, Susanne Barth and Menno de Jong list 
dozens of theories of cognitive phenomena that scholars have used to explain the privacy 
paradox. See Susanne Barth and Menno D.T. de Jong, The Privacy Paradox – 
Investigating Discrepancies Between Expressed Privacy Concerns and Actual Online 
Behavior – A Systematic Literature Review,  34 Telematics and Informatics 1038 (2017).   
67 Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, Privacy Attitudes and Privacy Behavior: 
Losses, gains, and Hyperbolic Discounting, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 
9 (Jean Camp and R. Lewis eds. 2004).  
68 Acquisti and Grossklags, Privacy Attitudes and Privacy Behavior, supra note X.  
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Brandimarte, Alessandro Acquisti, and George Lowenstein argues that 
“more control over the publication of private information makes control 
over information access and use by others appear less salient, which 
consequently decreases individuals’ privacy concerns, and increases their 
willingness to publish sensitive information about themselves.69 In other 
words, people are more comfortable supplying personal data when they feel 
in control –even if that control is illusory.70  
B. FRAMING EFFECTS 
 
People’s decisions about privacy are quite malleable and often turn upon 
how choices are framed. For example, the timing of when privacy notices 
are presented significantly affects people’s decisions to share personal 
data.71 As Will Oremus notes, “Study after study has found that people’s 
valuations of data privacy are driven less by rational assessments of the risks 
they face than by factors like the wording of the questions they’re asked, the 
information they’re given beforehand, and the range of choices they’re 
presented.”72 
 
The “endowment effect” has a major impact on how people value privacy. 
The endowment effect involves people’s tendency to ascribe more value to 
something when they risk losing it and less value to the same thing when 
they don’t possess it but have the opportunity to obtain it. A study by Angela 
Winegar and Cass Sunstein found that people are “willing to pay relatively 
little ($5 per month) for privacy, but demand much more ($80 per month) 
to give up privacy.”73 Winegar and Sunstein note that this is an “unusually 
large disparity” and a “kind of superendowment effect.”74  
 
A study led by Alessandro Acquisti found that “endowment effects 
powerfully influence individual privacy valuations.”75 The researchers 
 
69 Laura Brandimarte, Alessandro Acquisti, and George F. Loewenstein, Misplaced 
Confidences Privacy and the Control Paradox, 4 Social Psychological and Personality 
Science, 340 (2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3305325. 
70 Woodrow Hartzog contends that much of the controls provided on sites is “illusory.” 
Woodrow Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 European Data Protection Law 
Review 423, 426 (2018).  
71 Serge Egelman, Janice Tsai, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Alessandro Acquisti , Timing Is 
Everything? The Effects of Timing and Placement of Online Privacy Indicators, CHI '09: 
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems 319 
(2009). 
http://www.guanotronic.com/~serge/papers/chi09a.pdf. 
72 Will Oremus, How Much Is Your Privacy Really Worth? No one knows. And it might be 
time to stop asking, OneZero (Sep 17, 2019),  https://onezero.medium.com/how-much-is-
your-privacy-really-worth-421796dd9220. 
73 Angela G. Winegar and Cass R. Sunstein, How Much Is Data Privacy Worth? A 
Preliminary Investigation, 42 Journal of Consumer Policy (2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413277. 
74 Id. 
75 Acquisti, Alessandro, Leslie K. John, and George Loewenstein., What Is Privacy Worth? 
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noted: “The answers to questions such as ‘What is privacy worth?’ and ‘Do 
people really care for privacy?’ depend not just on whom, but how, you 
ask.”76 The study also revealed significant effects based on the ordering of 
choices.77 
C. BEHAVIORAL MANIPULATION AND SKEWING  
 
Another explanation for the privacy paradox is that people’s behavior is 
being manipulated by companies and skewed by technological design. 
Professor Siva Vaidhyanathan contends that people’s privacy choices online 
“mean very little” because “the design of the system rigs it in favor of the 
interests of the company and against the interests of users.”78 
 
In his illuminating book, Privacy’s Blueprint, Professor Woodrow Hartzog 
argues that “there are overwhelming incentives to design technologies in a 
way that maximizes the collection, use, and disclosure of personal 
information.”79  Hartzog notes that design “affects how something is 
perceived, functions, and is used.”80 He further points out: 
 
Because people react to signals and constraints in predictable ways, 
the design of consumer technologies can manipulate its users into 
making certain decisions. Design affects our perceptions of 
relationships and risk. It also affects our behavior.81 
 
As Professor Ari Waldman notes, the privacy paradox “reflects users 
responding in predictable ways to the ways in which platforms leverage 
design to take advantage of our cognitive limitations.”82 Computer scientist 
Arunesh Mathur uses the term “dark patterns” to describe “interface design 
choices that benefit an online service by coercing, steering, or deceiving 
users into making decisions that, if fully informed and capable of selecting 
alternatives, they might not make.”83 
 
Not all behavioral skewing occurs because of deliberate design choices. 
Skewing sometimes occurs just because technology changes the 
circumstances in which people live and act. For example, people today 
 
42 Journal of Legal Studies 249 (2013). 
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE SHOULD WORRY) 
83 (2011).   
79 WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES 5 (2019). 
80 Id. at 21.  
81 Id. at 23.  
82 Ari Ezra Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the “Privacy Paradox,” 31 
Current Issus in Psychology (forthcoming 2020). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456155. 
83 Arunesh Mathur et al, Dark Patters at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11K Shopping 
Websites, 3 ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., No. CSCW, Article 81. (2019).   
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widely expose their personal data on social media sites and elsewhere. 
Although developers of social media platforms design them in ways that 
encourage more data sharing, another factor that leads to more data sharing 
involves the nature of technology. The Internet makes it easier for people to 
share information without the normal elements that can make them fully 
comprehend the consequences.  If people were put in a packed auditorium, 
would they say the same things they say online?  Most likely not.  When 
people post online, they don’t see hundreds of faces staring at them.  Seeing 
all those people makes the consequences of speaking more visceral in the 
immediate moment – much more than just seeing a computer 
screen.  People also say things online that they’d never say to another person 
face-to-face. 
 
Ultimately, whether design is created deliberately to manipulate us or 
unwittingly skews behavior, the end result is the same – people share data 
in ways that they might not otherwise have shared.   
D. MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND LACK OF KNOWLEDGE  
 
Many surveys ask people about general preferences about privacy.  But 
when people are asked questions to find out how much they understand the 
choices they are making with their personal data, their level of knowledge is 
often quite limited or they have significant misunderstandings.84 
 
Professor Joseph Turow has performed numerous studies showing a 
knowledge gap where consumers falsely believe that rules ban uses and 
selling for information. In a typical finding, 75% of people incorrectly 
believed that the when “a website has a privacy policy, it means the site will 
not share [their] information with other websites or companies.”85  In 
another study, also led by Turow, people correctly answered only 30% of 
questions regarding their privacy online.86   
 
Ignorance of privacy rules can even explain popular conceptions of 
 
84 Jay P. Kesan, Carol Hayes, and Masooda N. Bashir, A Comprehensive Empirical Study 
of Data Privacy, Trust, and Consumer Autonomy,91 Indiana L.J. 267 (2016).  
85 Joseph Turow, Lauren Feldman, & Kimberly Meltzer, Open to Exploitation: American 
Shoppers Online and Offline, Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of 
Pennsylvania, Jun. 1, 2005. Another study also found that a majority of people falsely 
believed that having a privacy policy meant that a site couldn’t share personal data with 
third parties. See Joseph Turow, Jennifer King, Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Amy Bleakley and 
Michael Hennessy, Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that 
Enable It (September 29, 2009), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478214 
(finding that that 62% think this statement is true, and 16% "don't know": “If a website has 
a privacy policy, it means that the site cannot share information about you with other 
companies, unless you give the website your permission.”). 
86 Joseph Turow et al., Contrary to What Marketers Say, Americans Reject Tailored 
Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It 20–21 (Sept. 29, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1478214. 
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consumer privacy behavior. For instance, in their article discussing Alan 
Westin’s theory of privacy, Chris Hoofnagle and Jennifer Urban show that 
that people that Westin categorized as privacy “unconcerned” or privacy 
“pragmatist” were more ignorant of actual privacy rules and regulations and 
tended to falsely believe that protections were in place than people Westin 
categorized as privacy “fundamentalists.” When informed of the gap 
between what consumers thought were the rules and the reality that legal 
protections did not exist, privacy pragmatists made decisions more 
consonant with privacy fundamentalists.87 
 
A study by Professor Kirsten Marin demonstrated that people wrongly 
interpreted a privacy notice to be “more protective of consumer data than 
the actual notice included in the survey.”88  Martin found that “respondents 
projected the important factors to their privacy expectations onto the 
privacy notice. Privacy notices became a tabula rasa for users’ privacy 
expectations.”89 Not only do people have misunderstandings about privacy 
notices, but these misunderstandings are systematic and predictable based 
on people’s privacy expectations.  
E. INERTIA AND FRICTION  
 
Another explanation for the privacy paradox is that people generally have 
inertia when it comes to taking steps to protect their privacy. People hardly 
ever read privacy notices.90  They rarely opt out.91  They often don’t change 
default privacy settings.92 
 
 
87 Chris Jay Hoofnagle and Jennifer M Urban, Alan Westin’s Privacy Homo Economicus, 
49 Wake Forest L. Rev 261 (2014). 
88 Kirsten Martin, Privacy Notices as Tabula Rasa: An Empirical Investigation into How 
Complying With a Privacy Notice Is Related to Meeting Privacy Expectations Online, 34  
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing (2015), at p. 25. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275407645_Privacy_Notices_as_Tabula_Ras
a_An_empirical_investigation_into_how_complying_with_a_privacy_notice_is_relate
d_to_meeting_privacy_expectations_online_1  
89 Id. at 26. 
90 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the 
Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 165, 178 (2011) (discussing a study that revealed that people accessed contract 
boilerplate terms far less than 1% of the time); George R. Milne & Mary J. Culnan, 
Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy Risks: Why Consumers Read (or Don’t Read) 
Online Privacy Notices, 18 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 15, 20–21 (2004) (finding that 
only 4.5% of respondents said they always read website privacy notices and 14.1% 
frequently read them). 
91 See Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information 
Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1230 (2002) (stating 
that according to one survey, “only 0.5% of banking customers had exercised their opt-out 
rights”). 
92 See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us 
About Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY 363, 369 (Alessandro Acquisti, Stefanos Gritzalis, 
Costas Lambrinoudakis & Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati eds., 2008). 
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As William McGeveran notes, companies that desire people to share 
personal data aim to create an architecture of “frictionless sharing” to 
encourage people to share their personal data more readily.93 McGeveran 
points out that companies use the term “friction” to describe “forces that 
impede individuals from disclosing personal information when they use 
online services, particularly social networks.”94 Many companies that want 
people to share more personal data strive to reduce friction. McGeveran 
argues that regulation should seek to increase friction to make people more 
careful in sharing. He quotes a line that Lawrence Lessig once penned: 
“Friction is . . . privacy’s best friend.”95 
 
Friction also has a flip side for privacy. Just as readily as friction can 
discourage people from sharing personal data, it can discourage people 
from engaging in privacy-protective behaviors. The more cumbersome it 
becomes to change privacy settings, opt out, and implement other privacy-
protective measures, the less likely it is that people will do these things. For 
example, in a study led by Susan Athey, the researchers found that 
“whenever privacy requires additional effort or comes at the cost of a less 
smooth user experience, participants are quick to abandon technology that 
would offer them greater protection.”96 Friction, then, can become privacy’s 
worst enemy.  Companies can intentionally raise the friction for people to 
exercise privacy-protective choices, resulting in a shift in people’s behavior. 
People’s failure to read privacy policies, opt out, and take other small 
privacy-protective steps might be more the outcome of inertia and friction 
than the product of their privacy preferences.   
 
* * * 
 
The behavior distortion argument demonstrates that behavior is extremely 
malleable and thus offers a compelling case for why behavior is not a reliable 
metric for people’s actual attitudes about privacy. The behavior distortion 
argument undercuts the behavior valuation argument at its central premise, 
and therefore is the clear victor between the two types of responses to the 
privacy paradox.  But as I contend in the remainder of this Article, the 
behavior distortion argument does not go far enough as a response to the 
privacy paradox. 
 
  
 
93 William McGeveran, The Law of Friction, U. Chicago Legal Forum Vol. (2013), Article 
3, at 15,  https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2013/iss1/3. 
94 Id. at 15. 
95 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 202 (2006) 
96 Carleton Athey, Susan and Catalini, Christian and Tucker, Catherine E., The Digital 
Privacy Paradox: Small Money, Small Costs, Small Talk, MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 
5196-17; Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-14 (April 
8, 2018). 
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IV. PARADOX DENIED:  
RISK AND CONTEXT 
 
The behavior distortion argument undermines the behavior valuation 
argument’s contention that behavior is more reliable a metric of people’s 
actual preferences than stated attitudes about privacy. But are people’s 
stated attitudes accurate? The behavior distortion argument recognizes that 
people’s attitudes might also be subject to some of the same distorting 
factors as their behavior. Acquisti, along with Laura Branimarte and George 
Lowenstein, note that “people are likely to be uncertain about their own 
privacy preferences” because research “shows that individuals often have 
little sense of how much they like goods, services, or other people.”97 Thus, 
the very notion that people may have actual or true preferences must be 
qualified. Whether measured via stated attitudes or behavior, preferences 
themselves are not static; they are highly contextual, subject to distortion, 
and malleable.  
 
I propose another way to respond to the privacy paradox, one that takes a 
radical path.  I contend that the privacy paradox doesn’t exist and that 
individual preferences should not be the focus for establishing the value of 
privacy or for determining whether regulation is justified. 
 
Properly understood, the behavior in the privacy paradox studies is about 
preferences that involve risk assessments in contextual situations. In 
contrast, people’s attitudes about privacy are often stated more generally – 
applying across different contexts. Thus, there is no inconsistency between 
behavior and attitudes because they are about very different things.   
 
The behavior valuation argument often ends up making claims about the 
value of privacy based on privacy paradox studies. These claims are based 
on a series of improper generalizations from people’s behavior. Behavior 
involves a choice based on risk in a very specific context. In its most narrow 
formulation, the behavior valuation argument generalizes about people’s 
preferences involving the specific personal data to reach conclusions about 
people’s preferences about the same data more broadly across many 
contexts. The argument often generalizes even further, going beyond the 
specific pieces of data involved with the behavior to make conclusions about 
how people value the general type of personal data or even to how people 
value all personal data.  And, the argument frequently doesn’t stop there: It 
generalizes to how people value their privacy in total. This last 
generalization is based on a reductive conception of privacy, often viewing 
people as not caring about their privacy if they share their data with third 
parties. Privacy involves much more than whether or not to share personal 
 
97 Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Branimarte, and George Lowenstein, Privacy and Human 
Behavior in the Information Age, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 184, 186 
(Jules Polonetsky, Evan Selinger & Omer Tene, eds., 2017). 
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data.    
 
In this Part, I explain that many oft-stated conclusions made about the 
privacy paradox do not follow from people’s behavior. The privacy paradox 
emerges from conflated issues, unwarranted generalizations, and leaps in 
logic.  When the curtain is finally pulled away from the privacy paradox, we 
see a surprising revelation -- there is no paradox after all.     
A. VALUE AND RISK 
 
The behavior in the privacy paradox studies isn’t about the value of privacy; 
instead, the behavior involves decisions about risk in specific contexts.  
These contexts often involve particular pieces of personal data disclosed to 
particular parties with particular expectations of use. People’s behavior 
doesn’t conflict with how much they value privacy. Decisions about risk are 
different from value. Risk involves the potential for harm or loss. Value is 
the overall importance that a person ascribes to something.  
 
There is also a difference between how much a person values her own 
privacy versus how much a person values privacy in general.  A person 
might not want much personal privacy but could still consider privacy 
valuable from a societal perspective because of its importance to other 
people’s freedom and well-being. Just because a person doesn’t choose 
privacy for herself doesn’t mean that she ascribes no value to the right to 
privacy. The value of privacy isn’t based on one’s particular choice in a 
particular context; privacy’s value involves the right to have choices and 
protections. People can value having the choice even if they choose to trade 
away their personal data; and people can value others having the right to 
make the choice for themselves.   
 
The behavior in the privacy paradox studies reveals preferences in specific 
situations; the behavior doesn’t reveal enough to draw accurate conclusions 
about how individuals value privacy. People’s preferences are revealed 
through certain choices that they make between alternatives, and these 
choices occur at a specific time and place, in a specific context, and between 
a specific set of alternatives.98 The conclusion that can be made from this 
behavior is that in a particular time and place, in a specific context, people 
choose one alternative over another.  Any broader conclusions often do not 
logically follow.   
 
 
98 Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie John, and George Lowenstein aptly observe that the wrong 
conclusions are drawn based on how people make decisions about their personal data: 
“Individuals’ decisions about their data are sometimes taken as representing true and final 
preferences towards protection or revelation of personal data, and therefore become an 
instrument for the assignment of societal resources to privacy issues.” Alessandro Acquisti, 
Leslie K. John, and George Loewenstein, What Is Privacy Worth? 42 Journal of Legal 
Studies 249 (2013). 
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The behavior valuation argument often reaches conclusions about how 
people value privacy based on how readily they share their personal data.  
However, a more accurate way to understand the behavior exhibited in the 
privacy paradox is in terms of risk. The choices people are making involves 
their assessment of risk of harm, not how much they value privacy. 
Understood in terms of risk, what matters isn’t the fact that people share 
their personal data.  Many people don’t find sharing their personal data to 
be inherently harmful, but they are concerned about risks – potential 
downstream uses or disclosures that could harm them. For example, the 
study led by Sarah Spiekermann assessed behavior via people’s supplying 
personal data while shopping online.99 However, providing personal data to 
an online store doesn’t mean that people lack concern over privacy; people 
might have disclosed because they thought that their data would not be used 
in harmful ways.   
 
In another study, led by Zeynep Tufckci, many participants shared on their 
social media profiles information about their favorite books, movies, and 
music as well as their political views, religion, romantic status, and sexual 
orientation.100 However, when it came to phone numbers and addresses, the 
researchers found an interesting gender disparity: “The odds of a man 
indicating his phone number were 3 times that of a woman, and the odds of 
him indicating his address were 1.5 times that of a woman, even after 
controlling for privacy and audience concerns.”101 These results suggest 
people are focusing on risk; females likely are seeking to avoid the risk of 
unwanted attention.   
 
In the Tufckci study, to gauge general online privacy concerns, the 
participants were asked very broad questions such as “How concerned are 
you with online privacy?” or  “How concerned are you that people you do 
not want to see your profile will see it?”102  But a person could be concerned 
about online privacy and not be concerned about whether other people 
know their favorite movies, books, or music. A person might be concerned 
about harmful uses of their personal data.  When disclosing favorite things 
and even romantic status and sexual orientation, people might not have 
perceived a large risk. Ironically, people were more protective of less 
sensitive data such as phone numbers and addresses.  In terms of risk, this 
behavior makes sense; people could more readily imagine potential harm 
from receiving unwanted contact. 
 
Many of the studies exhibiting the privacy paradox do not show that people 
are ascribing a low value to privacy. Instead, they show people making 
 
99 Spiekermann et al, supra note X.  
100 Zeynep Tufckci, Can You See Me Now? Audience and Disclosure Regulation in Online 
Social Network Sites, 28 Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 20 (2008).  
101 Id.   
102 Id.   
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decisions involving privacy risks. For example, in the Beresford study, 
conducted in the EU, the researchers focused on whether people provided 
their monthly income and date of birth to measure their commitment to 
privacy.103  People might not have thought that this data raised any notable 
risks of harm if shared. People didn’t publicly release their data; they 
provided it to stores. The stores were required to follow the EU’s strong 
privacy regulation, which protects against many privacy risks. Thus, 
providing data to the stores doesn’t demonstrate that the respondents 
barely valued privacy. Instead, it indicates that the respondents viewed the 
sharing of the data as low risk in the specific context – that the stores would 
not use the data in ways that would harm them or that the data would not 
be publicly disclosed and later used to cause harm.   
B. IMPROPER GENERALIZING FROM SPECIFIC CONTEXTS 
 
When people agree to share their data, they share it in a particular context 
with particular entities.104 People have assumptions about what these 
entities might do with the data. For example, a person might be fine 
providing her address to a retailer for $1 because she assumes that the 
retailer will use the address to send catalogs or share it with other similar 
retailers. She would likely behave quite differently if asked to share her 
personal data with a stalker or a hate group.   
 
The conclusion that can be drawn from these instances is not that people 
value privacy at a particular amount or even that people value specific pieces 
of data at a particular amount. Instead, the main conclusion is that in a 
particular context when data is provided to a particular entity, a person is 
assessing the risk of undesirable uses as lower than the particular monetary 
reward. 
 
Moreover, the fact that people state concerns over their privacy doesn’t 
mean that they are concerned about each and every instance of personal 
data disclosure or use. As Kirsten Martin and Helen Nissenbaum aptly 
observe: “Privacy is not lost, traded off, given away, or violated simply 
because control over information is ceded or because information isshared 
or disclosed—only if ceded or disclosed inappropriately.”105 In studies about 
 
103 Alastair R. Beresford, Dorothea Kübler, and Sören Preibusch, Unwillingness to Pay for 
Privacy: A Field Experiment 117 Economics Letters 25 (2012).  
http://ftp.iza.org/dp5017.pdf. 
104 “[P]rivacy should be conceptualized contextually as it is implicated in particular 
problems.” Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1087, 1093 
(2002); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008); HELEN 
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF 
SOCIAL LIFE (2009); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 Wash.L. 
Rev. 119 (2004). 
105 Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, Measuring Privacy: An Empirical Test Using 
Context to Expose Confounding Variables, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 176, 191 (2016). 
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attitudes, people are often asked to think generally about privacy concerns. 
These general concerns are stripped of context – there is often no indication 
of to whom the personal data will be disclosed, how it will likely be used, or 
what ways it might be protected.  Sometimes, people are asked broadly if 
they care about privacy without indicating precisely what types of personal 
data they are most concerned about and what types of personal data do not 
pose concern.  In contrast, the studies about behavior are performed in a 
highly-contextual manner.  The studies nearly all involve specific pieces of 
personal data, shared in specific ways to specific people or entities or on 
specific sites. Indeed, as Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis Taylor, and Liad 
Wagman note: “small changes in contexts and scenarios can lead to widely 
differing conclusions regarding consumers' willingness to pay to protect 
their data.”106 
 
Often, stated preferences are not articulated to the same degree of 
specificity as people’s observed behavior. The behavior might appear to be 
in conflict with a stated preference when, in fact, the inconsistency is due to 
the false assumption that the stated preference encompasses the risks 
undertaken by the behavior.  There are many privacy issues, and not all 
might trouble everyone.  Some people might be most troubled when a lot of 
data is being gathered about them by large companies. Other people might 
worry primarily about government surveillance and access to their data but 
might be relatively unconcerned when companies or marketers gather their 
data.  Some people might strongly object to their data being used to deliver 
advertisements to them. Other people might not care about ads. When 
people express concern about privacy, they might have very different things 
in mind.   
 
Also, it is wrong to reach general conclusions about all types of personal 
data from situations involving particular types of personal data. People care 
about certain types of personal data more than others; and the concern over 
which types varies from person to person. Although many people might not 
be concerned about keeping their address confidential, for a stalking victim 
who is attempting to hide from her stalker, the confidentiality of her address 
could be a matter of life or death. Some people might be very guarded about 
their income; other people might not be concerned at all.  Universal 
conclusions about all types of personal data do not logically follow from 
particular transactions involving particular pieces of personal data.   
 
Additionally, great caution should be used even when generalizing from one 
context to a nearly identical context at a different point in time. Even if the 
same data and parties are involved and even if the privacy risks are the 
same, a person’s risk assessments could be very different. When evaluating 
privacy risks in making a particular choice, people often do not consider 
 
106 Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis Taylor, and Liad Wagman, The Economics of Privacy, 54 J. 
Economic Literature 442, 478 (2016).   
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everything in a detailed calculus. They decide based on what is on the front 
burner in their mind at one moment in time.  The privacy paradox studies 
are not revealing a set of fixed preferences; they are revealing people’s 
choices based on an assessment of risk in a particular context at a particular 
time. People don’t assess risk with perfect rationality like a machine 
calculating statistical odds. People make choices on the fly, in a snap 
judgment. Thus, broader conclusions about how people would act – even in 
the same or similar contexts – are dubious because at different points in 
time, people might make decisions about risk quite differently. These 
decisions depend upon a myriad of factors: what they are currently thinking 
about, how long they take to make the decision, how aware they are of 
certain potential privacy risks, and so on.   
C. THE MANY DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 
 
The privacy paradox also is often based on misunderstandings of privacy. 
Frequently, conclusions are drawn from studies that go far beyond what the 
studies have demonstrated. These studies beg the question of what 
“privacy” means, frequently equating privacy with secrecy. For example, 
consider the Beresford study involving people sharing their monthly income 
and date of birth with an online store.  The study authors conclude: “The 
experiment demonstrates an unwillingness to pay for privacy as the vast 
majority of subjects provide their monthly income for a price discount of 
one.”107 This conclusion, however, is far broader than the experiment’s 
results demonstrate. The experiment merely shows that people are 
unwilling to pay to conceal their monthly income from a store; this is far 
more narrow than an “unwillingness to pay for privacy,” which presumably 
means all their personal data and all potential things that could be done 
with it.   
 
Proponents of the behavior valuation argument conclude from people’s 
disclosure of their personal data that they don’t care about the privacy of 
this data. This conclusion, however, relies on too narrow a conception of 
privacy – it views privacy as tantamount to secrecy. In Understanding 
Privacy, I have argued that “privacy” is not just one thing, but a group of 
related things.108 Privacy, however, isn’t just about keeping secrets. When 
people want privacy, they don’t want to hide away their information from 
everyone; instead, they want to share it selectively and make sure that it isn’t 
used in harmful ways.  Privacy isn’t all-or-nothing – it’s about modulating 
boundaries and controlling data flow. 
 
Thus, the fact that people share personal data doesn’t mean that they don’t 
 
107 Alastair R. Beresford, Dorothea Kübler, and Sören Preibusch, Unwillingness to Pay for 
Privacy: A Field Experiment 117 Economics Letters 25 (2012).  
http://ftp.iza.org/dp5017.pdf. 
108 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008). 
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care about privacy. In today’s Information Age, if people really wanted to 
keep all their information concealed, they’d have to live in a shack in the 
woods. The fact that people share data in an age where it is nearly 
impossible not to do so has little bearing on the value of privacy.  
 
Additionally, privacy has many dimensions, many of which are not alienable 
when people supply personal data to an organization. Many privacy laws 
require that organizations must keep personal data secure.109  Some laws 
limit usage or sale of consumer personal data.110  Under a number of laws, 
people retain the right to access their data, request that the data be deleted, 
and so on.111  These rights aren’t alienable; even after providing the data, 
people retain these rights. Thus, when people share personal data with 
organizations, they are not giving up all their privacy.  They are providing a 
license to use or share their data in certain ways, but they retain various 
privacy rights in that data.  Therefore, giving away the data doesn’t mean 
that they are sacrificing all privacy in their data. Instead, they are increasing 
privacy risks to some extent.    
 
When people provide data to researchers or organizations, they are doing 
so with certain expectations about use, and these expectations shape their 
assessment of the privacy risks involved. People generally expect that 
researchers and organizations will keep their personal data confidential or 
that they will not use their data in nefarious ways. When people give their 
data to others, they are thus not giving it up with the expectation that 
anything goes with regard to how their data is used, maintained, or 
transferred.  
 
 
109 See Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA) Safeguards Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (financial 
institutions must “develop, implement and maintain a comprehensive information security 
program”); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, 45 
C.F.R. § 164.530(c)(1) (requiring covered entities to “have in place appropriate 
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect the privacy of protected health 
information”).  
110 See California Consumer Privacy Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100-1798.199 (2018) 
(mandating that people have a right to opt out of the sale of their personal data to third 
parties). Several laws restrict secondary use.  See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
1681b; Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6802(c); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 2710(e); Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551(e); General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) Article 51(1)(b) (information must be “collected for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is 
incompatible with those purposes”).  
111 See Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (consumer has the right to 
obtain “information in the consumer’s file at the time of the request” as well as “sources of 
the information”); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
Regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1) (“an individual has a right of access to inspect and 
obtain a copy of protected health information”); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA), 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A) (right to access and delete data); California Consumer 
Privacy Act of 2018, § 1798.105(a) (“A consumer shall have the right to request that a 
business delete any personal information about the consumer which the business has 
collected from the consumer.”) 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3536265
Solove   •   The Myth of the Privacy Paradox 
25 
 
People are essentially making a risk assessment, and the monetary value for 
the data is really a payment to accept a certain amount of risk – it isn’t a 
payment to give up all privacy.  In fact, ironically, the existence of privacy 
protections might lower the monetary value needed for people to share their 
data because the protections reduce the risk of the data being used in certain 
problematic ways. In other words, the fact that people trade personal data 
for a small amount of money doesn’t suggest that there ought to be less 
privacy regulation;  instead, privacy regulation might be a factor in lowering 
the price of the personal data.  Even more boldly, perhaps privacy norms 
make people feel comfortable enough to share personal data with 
organizations or to engage in e-commerce. The existence of privacy 
regulation might end up facilitating more information flow than it restricts.   
 
* * * 
 
Time for a pop quiz: If a person shares the name of her favorite book in 
exchange for a $1 discount from a particular online bookstore, what can be 
concluded from this behavior?   
 
A. The person values privacy at only $1. 
B. The person values her own privacy at only $1. 
C. The person values the privacy of her personal data at only $1. 
D. The person values the privacy of her favorite book for only $1. 
E. The person values the data about her favorite book at only $1. 
 F. None of the above. 
 
The answer is F.  Answer A is wrong because behavior in a particular 
transaction does not reveal a person’s valuation of privacy in general.  It 
involves her assessment of risk in a particular situation. A person can value 
privacy highly but might not protect her own privacy. To use an analogy, a 
person could value the right to vote generally but not vote themselves. The 
fact that they don’t vote can be understood by looking at the context – for 
example, the person might live in a place where the election isn’t 
competitive.  
 
Answer B is wrong because the book is just one of many privacy issues, and 
its disclosure to a store might not be something that poses a concern to the 
person. 
 
Answer C is wrong because the book is just one piece of personal data and 
says nothing about other pieces of personal data.   
 
Answer D is wrong because it universalizes from one dimension of privacy 
to all dimensions of privacy.  The person provided the information about 
her favorite book to a store. The person could expect the data to remain 
confidential, to be kept secure, to be maintained accurately, and so on.  
Sharing data with another doesn’t mean that a person lacks concern over 
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privacy, as privacy has many dimensions beyond keeping data totally secret.    
 
Finally, E is a tempting answer because it is so narrow, but even this answer 
is wrong.  The person’s behavior doesn’t reveal how the person values the 
data about the book. This is because the data isn’t just being shared with the 
entire world and stripped of all protections. The behavior indicates that the 
person is willing to provide the data to a particular store for $1.   
 
In a different context, the price might be a lot higher.  Suppose the person 
worked for a company, the book was highly critical of that company, and the 
data was to be shared with the person’s boss. The person would likely not 
share it for just $1.  Moreover, providing the data to the store is different 
from publicly disclosing the data or providing it to a government spy agency 
or selling it to a hacker who might try to use it to guess passwords.  The 
person understands that the store operates under legal obligations for 
protecting the privacy of the data; and the person has an expectation about 
likely uses of the data.  The person might expect that the store will use the 
data to advertise to the person but not to defraud or harm her.   
 
Additionally, the fact that this is a bookstore might make the person assess 
the risk of sharing the name of her favorite book as lower because the 
disclosure seems quite relevant for a bookstore to want to know.  Moreover, 
the person’s feelings about the particular store can have an impact too – the 
person might trust a particular store more than other stores and thus be 
more willing to share personal data.  Another store without the same level 
of trust might have to provide a higher discount for the person to agree to 
share the data. 
 
So, what can be concluded when a person provides the name of her favorite 
book to an online bookstore for a $1 discount?  The conclusion that can be 
drawn is that in this particular transaction, at one particular time, involving 
a particular store and a particular piece of data, the person determined that 
the risk of sharing the data was low enough to undertake for a $1 discount.   
 
The behavior valuation argument, however, rarely makes such narrow 
conclusions. It leaps to much broader conclusions and creates a conflict 
with people’s attitudes, which are expressed much more generally. This 
produces an inconsistency.  Then, the fancy name of “privacy paradox” is 
slapped on, and it seems like something profound is going on.  In fact, what 
is really going on is just a failure of logic.  
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND REGULATION 
 
Although I contend that the privacy paradox isn’t a paradox, this doesn’t 
mean that the behavior exhibited in the studies should be ignored or 
dismissed as irrelevant to privacy regulation. People’s behavior generally 
demonstrates that they are failing to protect their own privacy and are 
readily sharing their personal data. What conclusions about privacy 
regulation should follow from people’s privacy behavior?   
 
In this Part, I make two broad contentions.  First, I critique the conclusion 
frequently made by proponents of the behavior valuation argument that the 
behavior demonstrates that privacy regulation overvalues privacy and 
should be lessened or curtailed.   
 
Second, I explain why counteracting the distortion on behavior will not 
substantially improve privacy protection.  Privacy regulation too often relies 
on privacy self-management as its major tool for privacy protection. This 
approach is doomed to fail, and it will not be saved by curing the 
irrationalities in people’s behavior because even totally rational people can’t 
succeed at privacy self-management. Instead, I suggest a different strategy 
for privacy regulation.    
A. DETERMINING THE VALUE OF PRIVACY 
 
The behavior valuation argument concludes that people’s behavior 
demonstrates that privacy regulation overvalues privacy and should be 
lessened. Regulation should avoid interfering with transactions where 
people are giving up personal data for goods, services, or discounts because 
the market has established a price for privacy.  As Adam Thierer argues,  
there is a value exchange when people trade their privacy to for online goods 
and services that “creates substantial benefits for both producers and 
consumers.”112 Theirer notes argues that despite the difficulty, we should 
seek to ascribe a monetary value to privacy “because we live in a world of 
limited resources and inescapable trade-offs.”113  
 
The behavior valuation argument’s approach to determining the value of 
privacy conflates individual valuation with the value of privacy. As I argue 
below, the value of privacy is very different from individual valuations of 
privacy. 
  
 
112 Adam Thierer, Are Benefit-Cost Analysis and Privacy Protection Efforts Incompatible? 
in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 561, 561 (Jules Polonetsky, Evan Selinger 
& Omer Tene, eds., 2017). 
113 Thierer, supra note X, at 561.  
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1. The Problems with Individual Valuation 
 
Neither attitudes nor behaviors are good metrics for the value of privacy. 
Looking at attitudes or behaviors involves attempting to arrive at the value 
of privacy empirically.  Privacy’s value, however, is not readily determined 
empirically.  One problem with looking at attitudes and behaviors is that 
they are focused on individuals – what they say and what they do. The 
behavior valuation argument fails because it seeks to determine the value of 
privacy for regulation based upon looking at individual valuations of privacy 
– often determined empirically in monetary terms.  When it comes to 
privacy regulation, however, it is the value of privacy, not individual privacy 
valuations, that should inform regulatory decisions. Privacy is a constitutive 
element of a free and democratic society and is valuable because it is 
instrumental for many important societal ends. The value of privacy and 
individual valuations of privacy are very different things.  Additionally, the 
value of privacy cannot be meaningfully captured in monetary terms.  
 
Moreover, the value of privacy should not be determined by looking at the 
average of individual attitudes or the preferences of the majority. Privacy’s 
value is based on its contribution to democracy, individual well-being, social 
structure, free expression and belief. Paul Schwartz aptly contends that 
“privacy is best conceived of as a constitutive element of civil society.”114  
Schwartz argues that privacy protections are necessary for “deliberative 
democracy and an individual capacity for self-determination.”115  As Zeynep 
Tufecki aptly observes: “Data privacy is more like air quality or safe drinking 
water, a public good that cannot be effectively regulated by trusting in the 
wisdom of millions of individual choices.”116 
 
Proponents of the behavior valuation argument often attempt to use 
calculations of the monetary value of personal data in making arguments 
about privacy regulation.  They point to many instances where people trade 
personal data for low monetary amounts and use this to argue that the cost 
of privacy regulation outweighs the monetary value of personal data to 
individuals.   
 
Attempting to establish a monetary value for privacy not only makes the 
mistake of focusing on individual valuation, but it worsens the error by 
attempting to define this individual valuation in monetary terms. 
Calculating a monetary value for privacy is fraught with error because 
calculations are based on individual risk decisions in specific contexts, 
which are not reflective of the value of privacy generally. As Winegar and 
Sunstein’s study involving the dramatic influence of the endowment effect 
 
114 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1607, 1613 
(1999). 
115 Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy, supra note X, at 1670.  
116 Zeynep Tufecki, The Latest Privacy Debacle, N.Y. Times (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/opinion/strava-privacy.html. 
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on valuation of personal data concludes: “The divergence between 
statements of value and actual behavior, together with imperfect 
information and the wide variation in monetary valuation depending on 
seemingly irrelevant contextual features, make it exceedingly difficult to 
place any kind of monetary value on data privacy.117 
Calculations of the monetary value of personal data are not only inaccurate, 
but also irrelevant for crafting privacy regulation. When assessing the value 
of a product in the marketplace, it makes sense to assess what people are 
willing to pay for it.  Individual assessments of value are useful to 
determining the general value of the product. But privacy isn’t a product. 
Privacy has a value beyond what people will pay for it and beyond how 
valuable it is to particular individuals. Of course, privacy doesn’t have 
transcendent value above all else; in particular situations, privacy can be 
trumped by other conflicting values. But there are other ways to value things 
beyond money and beyond focusing on individual valuations.    
 
Consider the arguments about monetary value if applied to free speech. 
Suppose a study revealed that the average person would agree to refrain 
from criticizing the government for $10.  We wouldn’t conclude that the 
value of free speech is $10. Instead, the value of free speech transcends 
particular transactions. Commentators would likely not talk about a “free 
speech paradox.”  
 
The fact that people trade their privacy for products or services does not 
meant that these transactions are desirable in their current form. Of course, 
privacy regulation should not halt all tradeoffs that people dislike; nor 
should it forbid all exchanges of personal data for goods or services.  But the 
mere fact that people make a tradeoff doesn’t mean that the tradeoff is fair, 
legitimate, or justifiable.  For example, suppose people could trade away 
food safety regulation in exchange for cheaper food.  There would be a price 
at which some people would accept greater risks of tainted food.  The fact 
that there is such a price doesn’t mean that the law should allow the 
transaction.  
 
Regulation has a role to play with privacy because there are problems with 
transactions involving personal data that the market fails to address. People 
are often forced into making tradeoffs. In one survey, 81% of respondents 
said that they had at least once “submitted information online when they 
wished that they did not have to do so.”118 People often are not afforded 
much choice or face a choice between two very bad options.   
 
On the Internet, people are often presented with a take-it-or-leave-it choice: 
 
117 Angela G. Winegar and Cass R. Sunstein, How Much Is Data Privacy Worth? A 
Preliminary Investigation, 42 Journal of Consumer Policy (2019) (citation omitted), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413277. 
118 Jay P. Kesan, Carol Hayes, and Masooda N. Bashir, A Comprehensive Empirical Study 
of Data Privacy, Trust, and Consumer Autonomy,91 Indiana L.J. 267, 271 (2016).  
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provide personal data, allow certain uses, and receive access to information; 
or don’t provide personal data, don’t use the service, and don’t receive 
access to the information. This set of choices stems from the common 
business model of the Internet: Provide free online content and monetize it 
by collecting, using, or selling personal data. Chris Hoofnagle and Jan 
Whittington contend that most “free” online services and information are 
not free – the price is people’s data.119 Even more problematic is the fact that 
personal information is not like money. Transaction costs and opportunism 
inure in personal information transactions that can affect the parties long 
after the initial trade.120   
 
 
Written by Daniel J. Solove and illustrated by Ryan Beckwith 
 
New technologies are a major fact of our lives.  We live in a world where it 
is becoming increasingly hard to forgo using these technologies, especially 
when they are very useful and beneficial. People who want to protect their 
privacy must forgo using new products, which are increasingly made with 
Internet connections. They must forgo buying things online, using smart 
phones, using credit cards, and other basic tools of modern life. To escape 
from data collection, people must live an insolated and hermetic existence.   
 
Attempts to place a monetary value on personal data are doomed to be 
completely inaccurate as a metric of anything meaningful.  The monetary 
amount placed on privacy doesn’t reflect privacy’s value; at best it reflects a 
 
119 Chris Jay Hoofnagle and Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs 
of the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 606 (2014). 
120 Chris Jay Hoofnagle and Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs 
of the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 610 (2014). 
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risk assessment, which is infected by behavioral distortions and not able to 
be performed in a meaningful way due to lack of knowledge or lack of choice.  
To the extent to which people are resigned to not being able to self-manage 
their privacy, their choice to share personal data for any price is less a 
reflection of the value of the data and more a reflection of their 
powerlessness and resignation.    
2. Why Is Privacy Valuable? 
 
Why is privacy valuable? There are many reasons why privacy is valuable 
that involve the type of society we want to live in. These reasons 
demonstrate that privacy’s value isn’t measured by looking at how readily 
people trade their personal data. Below, I will briefly discuss a few of the 
most important reasons why privacy is valuable.   
 
Limit on Power.  Privacy is a limit on the power of the government and 
companies. The more someone knows about us, the more power they can 
have over us. Personal data is used to make very important decisions in our 
lives. Personal data can be used to affect our reputations; and it can be used 
to influence our decisions and shape our behavior. It can be used as a tool 
to exercise control over us. And, in the wrong hands, personal data can be 
used to cause us great harm. 
 
Respect for Individuals. Privacy is about respecting individuals. If a person 
has a reasonable desire to keep something private, it is disrespectful to 
ignore that person’s wishes without a compelling reason to do so. Of course, 
the desire for privacy can conflict with important values, so privacy may not 
always win out in the balance. Sometimes people’s desires for privacy are 
brushed aside because of a view that the harm in doing so is trivial. Even if 
this doesn’t cause major injury, it demonstrates a lack of respect for that 
person. In a sense it is saying: “I care about my interests, but I don’t care 
about yours.” 
 
Reputation Management. Privacy enables people to manage their 
reputations. How we are judged by others affects our opportunities, 
friendships, and overall well-being. Although we can’t have complete 
control over our reputations, we must have some ability to protect our 
reputations from being unfairly harmed. Protecting reputation depends on 
protecting against not only falsehoods but also certain truths. Knowing 
private details about people’s lives doesn’t necessarily lead to more accurate 
judgment about people. People judge other people poorly, they judge in 
haste, they judge out of context, they judge without hearing the whole story, 
and they judge with hypocrisy. Privacy helps people protect themselves 
from these troublesome judgments. 
 
Maintaining Appropriate Social Boundaries.  People establish boundaries 
from others in society. These boundaries are both physical and 
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informational. We need places of solitude to retreat to, places where we are 
free of the gaze of others in order to relax and feel at ease. We also establish 
informational boundaries, and we have an elaborate set of these boundaries 
for the many different relationships we have. Privacy helps people manage 
these boundaries. Breaches of these boundaries can create awkward social 
situations and damage our relationships. Privacy is also helpful to reduce 
the social friction we encounter in life. Most people don’t want everybody to 
know everything about them – hence the phrase “none of your business.” 
And sometimes we don’t want to know everything about other people — 
hence the phrase “too much information.” 
 
Trust.  In relationships, whether personal, professional, governmental, or 
commercial, we depend upon trusting the other party. Breaches of 
confidentiality are breaches of that trust. In professional relationships such 
as our relationships with doctors and lawyers, this trust is key to 
maintaining candor in the relationship. Likewise, we trust other people we 
interact with as well as the companies we do business with. When trust is 
breached in one relationship, that could make us more reluctant to trust in 
other relationships. 
 
Control Over One’s Life.  Personal data is essential to so many decisions 
made about us, from whether we get a loan, a license or a job to our personal 
and professional reputations. Personal data is used to determine whether 
we are investigated by the government, searched at the airport, or denied 
the ability to fly. Indeed, personal data affects nearly everything, including 
what messages and content we see on the Internet. Without knowledge of 
what data is being used, how it is being used, or the ability to correct and 
amend it, we are virtually helpless in today’s world. Moreover, we are 
helpless without the ability to have a say in how our data is used or the 
ability to object and express legitimate grievances when data uses can harm 
us. One of the hallmarks of freedom is having autonomy and control over 
our lives, and we can’t have that if so many important decisions about us are 
being made in secret without our awareness or participation. 
 
Freedom of Thought and Speech.  As Neil Richards contends, privacy is 
essential for intellectual freedom, such as freedom of speech, belief, and 
consumption of ideas.121 Watchful eyes over everything we read or watch 
can have a chilling effect on our exploration or expression of ideas outside 
the mainstream.122 Privacy is also key to the protection of communicating 
unpopular messages. And, privacy doesn’t just protect fringe activities. We 
may want to criticize people we know to those we know personally yet not 
share that criticism with the world. A person might want to explore ideas 
 
121 See NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE (2015). 
122 See Julie Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
Stan. L. Rev. 1373 (2000)  (“[P]ervasive monitoring of every first move or false start will, 
at the margin, incline choices toward the bland and the mainstream.”).  
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that their family, friends, or colleagues dislike. 
 
Freedom of Social and Political Activities.  Privacy helps protect our ability 
to associate with other people and engage in political activity. A key 
component of freedom of political association is the ability to do so with 
privacy if one chooses. We protect privacy at the ballot because of the 
concern that failing to do so would chill people voting their true conscience. 
Privacy of the associations and activities that lead up to going to the voting 
booth matters as well, because this is how we form and discuss our political 
beliefs. The watchful eye can disrupt and unduly influence these activities. 
 
Ability to Change and Have Second Chances. Many people are not static; 
they change and grow throughout their lives. There is a great value in the 
ability to have a second chance, to be able to move beyond a mistake, to be 
able to reinvent oneself. Privacy nurtures this ability. It allows people to 
grow and mature without being shackled by all the foolish things they might 
have done in the past. Certainly, not all misdeeds should be shielded, but 
some should be, because we want to encourage and facilitate growth and 
improvement. 
 
Protection of Intimacy, Bodies, and Sexuality.  Danielle Citron points out 
the importance of what she terms “sexual privacy,” which involves “the 
social norms (behaviors, expectations, and decisions) that govern access to, 
and information about, individuals’ intimate lives.”123 Privacy protects 
people’s bodies, sexuality, gender, and intimate relationships.  According to 
Citron, protecting sexual privacy helps people “manage the boundaries of 
their intimate lives” and respects “individuals’ choices about whom they 
entrust with their bodies and intimate information.”124  Protecting sexual 
privacy invasions is essential for equality, as privacy invasions occur more 
frequently and harmfully to women, minorities, and LGBTQ individuals.125  
 
Not Having to Explain or Justify Oneself.  An important reason why privacy 
matters is not having to explain or justify oneself. We may do a lot of things 
which, if judged from afar by others lacking complete knowledge or 
understanding, may seem odd or embarrassing or worse. It can be a heavy 
burden if we constantly have to wonder how everything we do will be 
perceived by others and have to be at the ready to explain. 
 
* * * 
 
Privacy has tremendous value as a constituent element of a free and 
democratic society. By this, I am not arguing that privacy is a fundamental 
right or that its value transcendent. To the contrary, privacy is valuable 
instrumentally for the various individual and social ends that it fosters.  The 
 
123 Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 Yale L.J. 1870. 1874 (2019).  
124 Id. at 1876.  
125 Id. at 1890-97. 
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behavior valuation argument ascribes a low value to privacy by improperly 
generalizing from highly-specific contexts. It wrongly equates what people 
will pay in a transaction with the value of privacy, which are entirely 
different things.   
B. THE IMPRACTICALITY AND FUTILITY 
OF MAKING PRIVACY RISK DECISIONS     
 
Another policy response to people’s behavior is to endeavor to counter the 
distortion of people’s behavior to align it with their attitudes.  For example, 
Susanne Barth and Menno de Jong argue that “privacy awareness” could 
“help users to avoid paradoxical behavior.”126 André Deuker recommends 
“raising privacy awareness on the application-specific level” and “raising 
knowledge” about how to protect privacy.”127 A study by Maor Weinberger 
found that increasing knowledge of the threats to privacy can “decrease the 
online privacy paradox behavior.”128 With education, nudges, strategic 
framing of choices, and other measures, people might improve the way that 
they protect their own privacy.   
 
Counteracting behavioral distortion, however, will not lead to significantly 
greater privacy protection.  Studies show that even when some of the 
distorting influences on behavior are countered, the shifts in behavior aren’t 
radical.129 People don’t start staunchly guarding their privacy or paying 
huge premiums for more privacy. For example, a widely-cited 2011 study 
lead by Janice Tsai concluded that “contrary to the common view that 
consumers are unlikely to pay for privacy, consumers may be willing to pay 
a premium for privacy.”130 In the study, people were asked to shop for 
batteries (low privacy concern) and a vibrator (high privacy concern). 
Participants could choose from three different online stores to buy these 
items.  One site had no privacy information, another had irrelevant 
information, and the third had information about privacy protections.131 
People paid more on the site with privacy information than on the other 
sites.  
 
126 Susanne Barth and Menno D.T. de Jong, The Privacy Paradox – Investigating 
Discrepancies Between Expressed Privacy Concerns and Actual Online Behavior – A 
Systematic Literature Review,  34 Telematics and Informatics 1038 (2017).   
127 André Deuker. Addressing the Privacy Paradox by Expanded Privacy Awareness - The 
Example of Context-Aware Services. 5th IFIP WG 9.2, 9.6/11.4, 11.6, 11.7/PrimeLife 
International Summer School (PRIMELIFE), Sep 2009, Nice, France. pp.275-283, 
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01061063/document.  
128 Maor Weinberger*, Dan Bouhnik, Maayan Zhitomirsky-Geffet, Factors Affecting 
Students’ Privacy Paradox and Privacy Protection Behavior, 1 Open Information Science 3, 
13 (2017). 
129 Janice Tsai, Serge Egelman, Laurie Cranor, and Alessandro Acquisti, The Effect of 
Online Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study, 22 
Information Systems Research 234 (2011).  
130 Id.  
131 Id.  
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The findings do not present an overwhelming refutation of the privacy 
paradox. Although people “indicated that they had more privacy concerns 
when purchasing the vibrator as compared to the batteries, their purchasing 
patterns did not reflect their concerns.”132  The premium paid for privacy 
was about the same amount for the vibrator as for the batteries.133  The 
privacy premium was also quite low. For example, people paid an average 
of $15.26 for the vibrator on no information sites and $15.88 for it on 
privacy information sites, a difference of $0.62 – just 4%. The study thus 
demonstrates that making privacy information more visible has only a very 
modest effect on people’s behavior.  
 
Even if behavior can be changed significantly, trying to cure irrational 
behavior will not lead to a dramatic change in the effectiveness of privacy 
protection. In the rest of this section, I explain why as well as explore the 
implications of this claim.   
1. The Impracticality of Assessing Privacy Risks 
 
In many cases, it isn’t possible for people to assess privacy risks in a 
meaningful way.  This problem stems from the fact that privacy risks often 
involve how personal data will be used in the future.  People can be informed 
about immediate uses, but downstream uses far into the future become 
more difficult to figure out.   
 
Although people may have generalized privacy concerns, they have 
difficulty translating these concerns to specific situations involving specific 
pieces of personal data provided to specific entities. People might be 
generally concerned about their privacy but not realize the precise ways that 
their personal information will be used when they give it out.  
 
A complicated dimension of assessing privacy risk is understanding how 
personal data could be analyzed when combined into an extensive digital 
dossier about a person.  People give out bits of data here and there, and each 
individual disclosure to one particular entity might be relatively innocuous. 
But when the data is combined, it starts to become a lot more telling about 
a person’s tastes and habits. I call this phenomenon the “aggregation 
effect.”134 Modern data analytics works via algorithms examining patterns 
in large quantities of personal data.   
 
The risk assessment becomes much more complicated based on 
developments in machine learning – known as “artificial intelligence” in 
popular culture. Information-intensive firms are using data in more 
 
132 Id. at 18.  
133 Id. at 16. 
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surprising ways completely outside of consumer expectations. Through 
machine learning, firms are discovering subtle relationships among 
variables that can reveal information about a person in novel ways. For 
instance, Yilun Wang and Michal Kosinski’s research claims to detect sexual 
preference from merely viewing photographs of subjects.135 Kosinski also 
led a study that predicted personality traits from Facebook likes.136  
 
It is nearly impossible for people to understand the full implications of 
providing certain pieces of personal data to certain entities. People might 
not realize how certain pieces of data, when combined, can reveal other facts 
about themselves that they do not want to share.137  Even privacy experts 
will not be able to predict everything that could be revealed when data is 
aggregated and analyzed, because data analytics are often revealing insights 
from data that are surprising to everyone.138   
 
Thus, people’s decisions to share personal data are not just impulsive or 
irrational.  The benefits of sharing personal data are often easy to identify 
and understand -- such as access to interesting information, sharing one’s 
life with one’s friends, using new technologies, or receiving money, 
discounts, or free services. Privacy risks, in contrast, are often vague, 
abstract, and uncertain. Privacy risks fare poorly when pitted against 
immediate and concrete benefits that can be more readily understood and 
evaluated. 
2. Futility and Resignation  
 
Although some privacy paradox studies involve decisions about whether to 
share personal data, other studies reveal that people don’t take other steps 
to protect their privacy, such as opting out, choosing alternative merchants 
to transact with, reading privacy policies, accessing their personal data, 
exercising their privacy rights under the law, carefully calibrating one’s 
privacy settings on sites, encrypting their data, and so on.  Some of these 
privacy-protective steps are easy and cheap to do.   
 
The behavior distortion argument seeks to explain this lack of action as 
irrational – the product of manipulation, skewing, or certain cognitive 
biases and heuristics.  Alternatively, the behavior is explained as based on 
lack of knowledge. The implication is that if we can counteract the biases 
 
135 Yilun Wang & Michal Kosinski, Deep Neural Networks Are More Accurate than 
Humans At Detecting Sexual Orientation from Facial Images (2017) available at 
https://psyarxiv.com/hv28a/.  
136 Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell, and Thore Graepel, Private Traits And Attributes Are 
Predictable From Digital Records Of Human Behavior, 110 PNAS 5802 (Apr. 9, 2013), 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1218772110. 
137 SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note X, at 44-47.  
138 See JOHN CHENEY-LIPPOLD, WE ARE DATA: ALGORITHMS AND THE MAKING OF OUR DIGITAL 
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and heuristics, if we can stop the manipulation and skewing, and if we can 
educate people, then people will change their behavior and make it align 
better with their attitudes.   
 
Unfortunately, such a conclusion is too optimistic. Resolving these 
problems will not result in effective privacy protection. Instead, merely 
adjusting the conditions so that people engage in more steps to protect their 
privacy will lead to a dead-end for privacy regulation.  Although some 
studies show that people actually engage in more privacy-protective 
behavior if the conditions are changed, the effect is limited at best.139 I 
contend that even if people acted rationally with full knowledge, they could 
not meaningfully protect their privacy without radically disconnecting from 
the modern world.   
 
The problem with privacy self-management is that it doesn’t scale.  Viewed 
in isolation, a person’s not reading a particular company’s privacy policy or 
not opting out might seem irrational given her preferences.  But when she 
must do so on a gigantic scale, across hundreds and even thousands of 
websites and organizations, the task is overwhelming. When each individual 
choice or action to protect privacy is viewed in isolation, it appears as simple 
and not onerous. When people fail to take these small steps, they are viewed 
as not caring about privacy because the steps are so small.  But the larger 
context is missing: there are too many of these little tasks in totality.  For 
example, a study by Aleecia McDonald and Lorrie Cranor concluded that if 
people were to read every privacy notice relevant to them, it would take 
about 201 hours a year.140 Their study focused just on reading privacy 
notices; privacy self-management also involves countless other tasks, many 
of which can take much longer than reading a privacy notice. 
 
One rational response is resignation. A person acting rationally could 
readily conclude that she can’t do enough privacy-protective tasks to make 
a meaningful difference for her privacy, and thus it is not worth the effort to 
do many such tasks given the enormity and tediousness of the overall 
project. Indeed, as a privacy expert, I confess that I’m quite resigned. For 
example, I don’t like receiving catalogs in the mail.  I used to spend a lot of 
time and effort trying to opt out, but eventually, I gave up because the 
catalogs kept multiplying.  I didn’t have time to keep at it, and it was a losing 
battle. 
 
In a study, Eszter Hargittai and Alice Marwick interviewed young people 
about their social media use.  The interviewees expressed awareness of 
many privacy risks associated with disclosing their personal data online, but 
they felt resigned to their limited control over their data: “[P]articipant 
comments suggest that users have a sense of apathy or cynicism about 
 
139 Tsai et al., supra note X.  
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I/S, A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 540, 565 (2008).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3536265
Solove   •   The Myth of the Privacy Paradox 
38 
 
online privacy, and specifically believe that privacy violations are inevitable 
and opting out is not an option.”141  
 
Christian Hoffmann, Christoph Lutz, and Giulia Ranzini posit that the 
privacy paradox might be due to what they call “privacy cynicism.”142 They 
hypothesize that people with weak Internet skills will become cynical as a 
“coping mechanism” in the face of “uncertainty, powerlessness, and 
mistrust” that enables people to “discount risks or concerns without 
ignoring them.”143 Although I agree with the existence of privacy cynicism, 
I contend that it is not merely a coping mechanism. Privacy self-
management is too overwhelming a task to do; even when people try, they 
can’t learn enough to make informed decisions. Privacy cynicism is perhaps 
the most rational response of all no matter how much people know or how 
adroit they are with technology.   
 
Much privacy regulation attempts to protect privacy by giving people more 
privacy self-management, which often occurs in the form of granting people 
more individual rights regarding their personal data, such as a right to opt 
out of data sharing, a right to notice, a right to delete, and so on.  
 
Providing privacy rights isn’t a bad thing. But if the goal of privacy 
regulation is to protect people from harms that may arise from collecting, 
maintaining, using, or disclosing their personal data, then the regulation is 
failing.  
 
For example, the new California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) of 2018 
focuses extensively on privacy self-management.144  The law gives people 
robust rights to find out about the personal data that companies are 
gathering about them.  People can make a request to a company for 
information about their personal data, including all the specific pieces of 
personal information that companies have gathered about them over the 
past year.  The law then mandates that people have a choice to opt out of the 
sale of that data to third parties.  
 
At first glance, the law appears to give people a lot of control over their 
personal data – but this control is illusory. First, many companies gather 
and maintain people’s personal data without people knowing. People must 
know about the companies gathering their data in order to request 
information about it and opt out. So, the CCPA helps people learn about the 
data collected by companies they already know about but doesn’t help them 
 
141 Eszter Hargittai and Alice Marwick, "What Can I Really Do?": Explaining the Privacy 
Paradox with Online Apathy, 10 Int’l J. of Communication (Jan. 2016).  
142 Christian Pieter Hoffmann, Christoph Lutz, and Giulia Ranzini, Privacy Cynicism: A 
New Approach to the Privacy Paradox, 10 Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial 
Research on Cyberspace (2016).  
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learn much about what data is being gathered by other companies that 
operate in a more clandestine way.   
 
Second, the CCPA doesn’t scale well. The number of organizations gathering 
people’s data is in the thousands.  Are people to make 1,000 or more 
requests? Opt out thousands of times?  People can make a few requests for 
their personal data and opt out a few times, but this will just be like trying 
to empty the ocean by taking out a few cups of water.   
 
Third, even when people receive the specific pieces of personal data that 
organizations collect about them, people will not know enough to 
understand the privacy risks. Journalist Kashmir Hill notes how requests 
for personal data from companies often involve a data dump, which has 
limited utility: “[M]ost of these companies are just showing you the data 
they used to make decisions about you, not how they analyzed that data or 
what their decision was.”145 A list of pieces of personal data mainly informs 
people about what data is being collected about them; but privacy risks 
often involved how that data will be used. 
 
My concern about the CCPA is that although it is well-meaning, it might lull 
policymakers into a false belief that its privacy self-management provisions 
are actually effective in protecting privacy. Worse, it might greenlight 
extensive data selling — after all, under the CCPA, companies are allowed 
to sell data unless the individual opts out. Policymakers might pat 
themselves on the back and consider the problem of privacy to be largely 
solved.  Other measures to protect privacy might not be enacted.  
 
Of course, there is risk reduction when one partially manages privacy, but 
on the whole, the series of tasks involved in managing one’s privacy is 
endless, and many people might not see enough risk reduction in doing a 
few privacy self-management tasks to be worth the time, effort, or tradeoffs.   
 
The problem is that the privacy-protective options that the studies present 
to people are mostly privacy self-management activities.   People can’t really 
do self-management well, even when not encumbered by cognitive 
influences on their behavior. As I explained in the previous section, 
accurately assessing privacy risks is a daunting (if not impossible) task while 
managing privacy systematically is futile. Resignation is far from an 
irrational response. Although people might not consciously and rationally 
reach the conclusion that most of their efforts to protect privacy are futile, 
they might still sense it and resign themselves. 
 
Thus, perhaps people’s behavior isn’t so irrational after all.  They are just 
resigned to a world where there’s little meaningful action they can take.  
 
145 Kashmir Hill, “I Got Access to My Secret Consumer Score. Now You Can Get Yours, 
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This conclusion doesn’t mean that people will always throw caution to the 
wind and post all of their personal data publicly online.  Instead, recognition 
of the futility might make people more inclined to trade personal data for 
small rewards, use new technologies that carry significant privacy risks, not 
opt out of data sharing and uses, fail to use the optimal privacy settings, or 
not request information from companies about the use of their personal 
data, among other things.  Indeed, at some point nearly everyone will reach 
the limit of how much privacy self-management they can do; some just 
reach the limit sooner than others.   
 
Meaningful privacy protection cannot rely primarily on privacy self-
management. Providing rights to manage privacy can be helpful in 
particular contexts, but an overall strategy to protect privacy will fail if 
replying on people doing an almost infinite amount of privacy self-
management.  People will get more forms to request information about data 
collected about them. They will be given more buttons, switches, tick boxes, 
and toggles.  With hearty idealism about empowering people, proponents of 
privacy regulation aim to give people more control over their personal data, 
but the result is often doling out more homework for people, heaping on 
more tasks that people lack the time or ability to do.   
 
The control that people are being given is illusory. It’s not real control, just 
busy work. When people fail to complete the infinite mountain of tasks, 
when they give up, or when they don’t bother to try, the situation starts to 
resemble the privacy paradox. The behavior valuation argument claims that 
the failure indications that people are not very concerned about their 
privacy. The blame is placed on people for not doing enough to protect their 
privacy; people might even blame themselves.  
 
The privacy paradox is a myth, born out of this vicious cycle when people 
express concerns about their privacy, are given a dose of privacy self-
management in response, fail to succeed at the impossible project of privacy 
self-management, and then become disillusioned and resigned.  People then 
continue to express privacy concerns – and the cycle keeps repeating. To be 
effective, privacy regulation must break out of this cycle. 
3. Regulating the Architecture of the Personal Data Economy 
 
There is a role for privacy regulation that goes beyond relying heavily on 
privacy self-management. A significant amount of privacy protection can be 
accomplished beyond merely affording people with notices, rights, and 
choices. Highly effective privacy regulation focuses on the architecture of 
the personal data economy -- data collection, use, storage, and transfer.  
 
For example, one component of this architecture involves regulating the 
transfer of personal data to third parties.  Organizations enter into contracts 
when transferring and receiving personal data to or from other 
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organizations. For mid-size to large organizations, these contracts can 
number in the hundreds or thousands. The extent to which these contracts 
protect personal data matters significantly.  This vast colony of contracts 
remains largely unseen by consumers, who are not involved in the drafting 
or negotiation of them. Privacy regulation can regulate the terms of these 
contracts.  
 
Privacy regulation can also regulate to make certain types of personal data 
transfers impermissible or more difficult to undertake.  Additionally, 
privacy regulation can control downstream transfers and uses of personal 
data, protecting the data as it flows from an initial transfer to other 
organizations down the line.    
 
Internal governance within organizations also matters. The resources and 
authority of the chief privacy officer (or the data protection officer as 
referred to in the EU) can have significant effects. Among other things, a 
powerful governance program involves conducting risk assessments, having 
privacy experts become involved early on in the design process for new 
technologies, and ensuring that privacy and ethics are taken into account in 
organizational decisions.  
 
Privacy regulation can also address the design of products or services by 
preventing designs that could lead to consumer harm or establishing 
processes for designers to use to better evaluate the risks new technologies 
pose.   
 
Additionally, regulation can establish boundaries for data collection and use 
by preventing them when beyond people’s likely expectations or when 
unfair or potentially harmful.  Regulation can ensure for effective data 
security and can restrict design that is insecure or that creates unwarranted 
privacy risks.   
 
The purpose of this Article isn’t to set forth a detailed recipe for privacy 
regulation; it is just to point out that there are approaches that go beyond 
more privacy self-management.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The privacy paradox is not a paradox.  A paradox is something that is self-
contradictory, often absurd.  But people’s behaviors and attitudes do not 
contradict one another. The behavior in the privacy paradox involves 
choices about risk in specific contexts. Attitudes involve people’s broader 
valuation of privacy, often across many contexts.   
 
The conclusions that many commentators draw after invoking the privacy 
paradox – that people’s behavior demonstrates that people really don’t 
value privacy and that privacy protection thus isn’t necessary – are 
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completely wrong.   
 
The privacy paradox is best interpreted not as an indication of how much 
people value privacy.  Instead, the phenomenon demonstrates behavior 
involving risk, where many factors might influence people’s decisions. 
 
The privacy paradox has become privacy lore, for it is constantly mentioned 
and discussed, and sometimes weaponized to attack privacy regulation. 
However, the privacy paradox is a myth. It only appears to be paradox 
because of conflated issues and flawed logic.  
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